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THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE FOR THE BENEFIT
OF AN ENCLOSED ESTATE
We cannot be blind to the great change in the nature of land
in our country and the needs of the people in regard to land
• . . The open country and estates . . . have rapidly disap-
peared, and the problems of access to estates for full utilization
of them have become more complex.
Louisiana Civil Code articles 689-695 contain rules pertaining to the
right of passage for the benefit of an enclosed estate. At hand is a
discussion of this servitude in light of four recent cases: Tusson v. Hero
Land Co.,2 Stuckey v. Collins,3 Fuller v. Wright, 4 and Dallas v. Far-
rington.'
L Tusson v. Hero Land Co.
The federal government expropriated a servitude across plaintiff
Tusson's land, and dug a drainage canal which isolated a strip of
Tusson's estate. Although there had been no judicial decree interpreting
the expropriation order to preclude building a bridge across the canal,
Tusson alleged that he was denied permission to construct such a pas-
sageway. On the basis of this allegation, he brought an action against
Hero Land Company, the owner of lands adjacent to the isolated
portion, seeking a right of passage. The court held that Tusson had
not met the burden of proof required of one seeking rights of passage
from an enclosed estate.6
Because Tusson filed suit prior to the 1977 revision to the Louisiana
Civil Code, the court applied former article 699. 7 According to the
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. Rockholt v. Keaty, 256 La. 629, 638, 237 So. 2d 663, 667 (1970).
2. 446 So. 2d 346 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 So. 2d 1359 (La. 1984).
3. 464 So. 2d 346 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
4. 464 So. 2d 350 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 So. 2d 737 (La. 1985).
5. 490 So. 2d 265 (La. 1986).
6. Tusson, 446 So. 2d at 350.
7. La. Civ. Code art. 699 (1870) provided:
The owner whose estate is enclosed, and who has no way to a public road,
railroad, or a tramroad may claim the right of passage on the estate of his
neighbor or neighbors to the nearest public road, railroad, or tramroad and
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interpretation given that article by the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Rockholt v. Keaty,8 to be granted a right of passage a landowner had
to prove that his lands were enclosed and that the right of passage he
sought was the shortest, most direct, and most feasible route to the
nearest public road. In Rockholt, the court held that an expropriation
of a non-access highway which isolated a portion of a tract of land
created an enclosed estate. Nevertheless, the court denied recovery be-
cause the landowner failed to prove that the passage sought was the
shortest, most direct, and most feasible access to a public road.9
In Tusson, the plaintiff did not prove either element of the Rockholt
test. The court defined "enclosed estate," as used in article 699, as one
that "is shut off from access to public roads because it is entirely
surrounded by other lands."' 0 Since Tusson owned the land on which
the canal was located, the court concluded that the isolated strip was
not "surrounded by other lands," and he did not own an enclosed
estate." Additionally, since the most direct access to the isolated land
was across the canal, until a court held that the expropriation order
precluded Tusson from constructing a bridge across the canal, a pas-
sageway across the servitude, rather than across the defendant's land,
was the "shortest most direct access to his enclosed lands.' 2
The Tusson court, in dicta, indicated that non-access: across an
expropriated servitude may satisfy both requirements of Rockholt. Rock-
holt itself supports this by recognizing that "non-access" may be a
determinative factor in finding that an estate is enclosed. The court in
shall have the right to construct a road, railroad or tramroad according to
circumstances and as the exigencies of the case may require, over the land of
his neighbor or neighbors for the purpose of getting the products of his said
enclosed land to such public road or railroad, tramroad or for the cultivation
of his estate, but he shall be bound to indemnify his neighbor or neighbors in
proportion to the damage he may occasion.
8. 256 La. 629, 641, 237 So. 2d 663, 668 (1970).
9. The plaintiff in Rockholt sought a right of passage over a neighbor's land back
to his own tract. The court found that the shortest, most direct route would be to a
public street in a nearby subdivision that was adjacent to the isolated portion. The court
concluded this was the shortest, most direct route even though zoning restrictions in the
neighborhood allegedly precluded passage.
10. Tusson, 446 So. 2d at 350. See English Realty Co. v. Meyer, 228 La. 23, 82
So. 2d 698 (1955), and Finn v. Eoff, 368 So. 2d 199 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1979). This
definition is based on prior La. Civ. Code art. 700 (1870), which read in part, "The
owner of the estate, which is surrounded by other lands ...", and prior La. Civ. Code
art. 702 (1870), which began, "A passage must be furnished to the owner of the land
surrounded by other land ...."
II. This distinguished Tusson from Rockholt, for in the latter case the government
had fully expropriated the land severing Rockholt's estate, rather than merely expropriating
a servitude.
12. Tusson, 446 So. 2d at 351.
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that case stated that, "estates surrounding enclosed lands may by the
very nature and method of their development pose problems in affording
access to the enclosed lands not foreseen or contemplated by the adopters
of the Code article."'" Because the estate in Rockholt fronted a non-
access highway and had no other access to a public road, it was enclosed;
Tusson suggests that non-access across a servitude dividing one's property
similarly creates an enclosed estate. Nevertheless, the court in Tusson
found that, until it was proven that access was absolutely denied, it
would have been "inequitable and premature" to order an adjacent
landowner, who did not create the complaining landowner's predicament,
to provide a right of passage.'
4
Revised Civil Code article 689 defines an enclosed estate as one
from which the owner has no access to a public road." This definition
reflects the holding of Rockholt. As such, meeting the requirements for
a right of passage should be easier under article 689 than under prior
article 699: a landowner should no longer have to prove that his lands
are surrounded by other lands. He merely should have to prove that
he has no access to a public road. If the landowner proves anything
less than non-access to a public road, he should not be entitled to an
article 689 passage. "Non-access" is an appropriate standard, because
"the inconvenience of passing over one's property, though extreme, will
not be a sufficient reason for forcing a neighbor to yield passage over
his.' ' 6 Absolute denial, however, goes beyond extreme inconvenience
and justifies granting a passage.
II. Stuckey v. Collins
Stuckey purchased a landlocked estate from Willis. Prior to the
purchase, Willis cleared a passageway to enable Stuckey access to a
public road. Unknown to Stuckey, the passageway crossed a strip of
land immediately adjacent to a public road belonging to Collins. Ex-
pecting to exchange this land with Willis, Collins assented to the con-
struction of the roadway. Stuckey used the passageway both before and
after the purchase of his lot. To protect himself from a possible threat
to ownership, Collins erected a barrier across the front of the roadway,
secured by a locked cable. Although Stuckey had a key, he removed
the cable because he grew tired of locking and unlocking it. After
Collins replaced the cable, Stuckey filed suit for an unrestricted right
of passage across Collins's land.
13. Rockholt, 256 La. at 639, 237 So. 2d at 667.
14. Tusson, 446 So. 2d at 351.
15. La. Civ. Code art. 689.
16. Pousson v. Porche, 6 La. Ann. 118, 119 (1851). See also Robinson v. Herring,
20 So. 2d 811 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944).
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Civil Code article 689 provides: "The owner of an estate that has
no access to a public road may claim a right of passage over neighboring
property to the nearest public road. He is bound to indemnify his
neighbor for the damage he may occasion."' 7 This article is generally
applicable when an estate becomes enclosed as the result of "fortuitous
events or irresistible force."'" On the other hand, if an estate becomes
enclosed as a result of a partition or voluntary alienation of a portion
of an estate, article 694 applies. Since Stuckey acquired his enclosed lot
by purchasing a portion of Willis's estate, Collins urged as a defense
that Willis, whose remaining property had access to a public road, owed
Stuckey a gratuitous right of passage in accordance with article 694.
Civil Code article 694 states:
When in the case of partition, or a voluntary alienation of
an estate or a part thereof, property alienated or partitioned
becomes enclosed, passage shall be furnished gratuitously by the
owner of the land on which the passage was previously exercised,
even if it is not the shortest route to the public road, and even
if the act of alienation or partition does not mention a servitude
of passage. 9
This article permits the owner of an enclosed estate to seek a right of
passage in certain instances without requiring him to indemnify the
servient estate owner. In Stuckey, the second circuit had to decide if
article 689 could be applied in a situation where article 694 may also
be applicable. The court never concluded that article 694 requirements
were met, but held instead that even if article 694 did apply, "where
passage across the vendor's land is impossible or highly impractical, an
enclosed owner, even though legally entitled to an article 694 servitude
across his vendor's property, may seek an article 689 servitude across
a neighbor's land." 20 The court employed a "balancing of interests"
17. La. Civ. Code art. 689.
18. A. Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes § 99, at 297 in 4 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1983). Examples include but are not limited to expropriation, as in Rockholt, and natural
causes recognized in such cases as Patin v. Richard, 291 So. 2d 879 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1974), where a beach road remained underwater most of the year making a would-be
passage impassable, and Morgan v. Culpepper, 324 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 326 So. 2d 377 (La. 1976), where property was deemed enclosed because
passage to a public road was "impassable" part of the year due to weather conditions.
19. La. Civ. Code art. 694.
20. Stuckey, 464 So. 2d at 348. Since Stuckey used the passageway over Collins'
land before the voluntary alienation, arguably Collins was the owner of the estate that
previously provided access to a public road. Thus, article 694 could have been interpreted
to force Collins to provide a servitude of passage gratuitously. However, the court
pretermitted any discussion of this issue, probably because such an interpretation of article
694 would be unconstitutional, being an unjust taking without compensation. See La.
Const. art. 1, § 4.
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test which it cautioned should be applied to a "limited extent on a case-
by-case basis."'" The court also held that Collins could not impede this
right of passage.
Three aspects of Stuckey warrant discussion: the applicability of
article 694, the balancing of interests test, and the impediment to passage.
A. Applicability of Article 694
Although Willis's tract at the time of the sale was supposed to
provide Stuckey access to a public road, in fact no road existed from
Stuckey's estate across Willis's to a public thoroughfare. The Stuckey
court's firstconcern as to the applicability of article 694 was whether
a vendor who otherwise owed a gratuitous passage is relieved from this
obligation if no roadway exists across his land connecting his vendee's
enclosed estate with a public road. This concern stemmed from the
language in article 694 that "passage shall be furnished gratuitously by
the owner of the land on which the passage was previously exercised."22
Strict adherence to this language suggests that an existing road is a
prerequisite to the applicability of article 694. Nevertheless, based on
the reasons behind affording an enclosed owner the right to seek a
gratuitous passage, this interpretation is strained.
Article 694 is based on convention. It "is founded on the implied
intent of the parties to an agreement." 2 Since vendors of land "warrant
the enjoyment of the thing sold, . . . the necessary passage should be
furnished by them gratuitously on the land that previously provided
access to a public road." ' 24 Therefore, since a seller of a landlocked
portion of his estate implicitly obligates himself to provide passage to
the purchaser, the absence of an existing roadway previously used over
the seller's estate should not relieve the vendor of his obligation. An
interpretation of article 694 more in line with this underlying policy
would be that the word "passage" merely refers to a link between the
original tract and a public road; it need not refer to a particular,
previously used form of access. The lands involved in the acts creating
the enclosed estate should furnish a gratuitous passage. 25
The conflict between a strict reading of article 694 and a reading
which reflects the underlying policy of that article may perhaps be
explained by concern within the legislature over the proper location of
the gratuitous servitude, when the original tract is subdivided or par-
21. Sluckey, 464 So. 2d at 348.
22. La. Civ. Code art. 694 (emphasis added).
23. Yiannopoulos, supra note 18, at 291.
24. Id. at 292.
25. See French Civ. Code art. 684.
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titioned into several portions. In Patin v. Richard,26 an owner of an
estate, by a common act of sale, sold a portion which was divided into
three lots, two of which were enclosed. One enclosed owner sued the
other for recognition of a right of passage over an existing driveway,
which extended through the third lot and to a public street. In deciding
that the defendant owed a gratuitous passage, the court could have
chosen to burden any part of the original tract with the servitude. It
concluded, however, that the phrase, "upon which the right of passage
was before exercised, ' 27 found in prior Louisiana Civil Code article 701,
meant that "the land which owes the servitude is that upon which it
had existed in the past." 2 8 Therefore, the lots on which the driveway
was located owed the right of passage, since the driveway existed at
the time of the sale of the enclosed estate. This reasoning applies as
well to partitions in kind, which often result in the formation of nu-
merous estates.
If, on the other hand, a roadway does not exist at the time of the
sale or partition, the entire original tract should be treated as a single
unit, and factors such as cost, convenience, and distance should be used
in locating the passageway. Since article 694 is based on convention,
after the estate which is to be burdened with the servitude is chosen,
Civil Code article 750, which appears in the chapter of the Civil Code
governing conventional servitudes, should be used to determine the lo-
cation of the passageway.29 In no case should the vendor's obligation
to provide passage to a vendee of an enclosed estate be relieved simply
because a roadway did not exist over the original tract.3 0 Thus, in
Stuckey, the court's first concern should have been decided in favor of
applying article 694.
The court's second concern was whether the obligation to furnish
passage gratuitously is transmitted to a vendor's successors, as Willis
26. 291 So. 2d 879 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
27. La. Civ. Code art. 701 (1870).
28. Patin, 291 So. 2d at 883.
29. La. Civ Code art. 750 states, "the owner of the servient estate shall designate
the location" if it is not otherwise provided for by title.
30. The disposition of the Stuckey case was based on French Civil Code articles
controlling enclosed estates. Under those articles, a landowner enclosed by virtue of a
voluntary alienation or partition is entitled to seek a passage for indemnification if a
sufficient gratuitous passage cannot be obtained. (see French Civ. Code art. 684). One
could argue that under Louisiana's Civil Code sufficient passage is further defined as one
existing at the time of the partition or voluntary alienation. This argument would lead
to an anomalous interpretation of article 694. Although they are similar in some aspects,
it is obvious from the differences between the French and Louisiana provisions that each
code does not attempt to reach the same results. Also, since the person creating the
enclosed estate should owe the servitude, passage should be found insufficient only in
the most extreme circumstances.
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had sold all the lots from the original tract. Professor Yiannopoulos
has stated that "the right to demand a gratuitous passage under airticle
694 may be asserted by universal or particular successors of the purchaser
against universal or particular successors of the vendor." '31 The most
recent decision recognizing this principle is Patin v. Richard. 2 The three
lots which resulted from the common act of sale were subsequently
acquired by successors of the original vendees. The court held that the
obligation owed by the vendor was enforceable against the present owners
of the lots which had previously provided access to a public road. Thus,
the obligation was transmitted to the vendor's successors.
Prior Civil Code article 701 in part provided that "the vendor,
coparcener or other owner of the land reserved, and upon which the
right of passage was before exercised, is bound to furnish the purchaser
or owner of the land inclosed with a passage gratuitously . . . ."" In
Patin v. Richard, Judge Domengeaux dissented because he felt that,
based on this clause, a gratuitous servitude was not owed unless the
right of passage had been previously exercised over the vendor's reserved
portion. This presupposes that the vendor would reserve a portion. The
majority in Patin, however, concluded that the land on which the passage
was previously exercised owed the servitude regardless of whether own-
ership had changed or whether enclosure had not resulted from the
initial sale. The majority's opinion has been codified in article 694 of
the Civil Code. The pertinent clause now states: "[Plassage shall be
furnished gratuitously by the owner of the land on which the passage
was previously exercised." '34 Therefore, it is not only the vendor who
reserves a remaining portion who is obligated to afford a gratuitous
passage, but his successors are also obligated. Similarly, if the original
vendor sells all of the original tract from which the enclosed estate was
created, his obligation to afford passage should be transmitted to his
successors. Article 694 recognizes this by requiring the gratuitous ser-
vitude when an enclosed estate results from the alienation of an estate
in whole or in part.
It should be noted that the public records doctrine has recently been
recognized as a defense to the transmittal of this obligation." Since
article 694 is based on agreement, and thus engenders a conventional
servitude, 6 the situation of the estates must be publicly recorded, or a
third party purchaser is not legally on notice that an enclosed estate
exists. Because Stuckey does not indicate that the estate was improperly
31. Yiannopoulos, supra note 18, at 294-95.
32. 291 So. 2d 879 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
33. La. Civ. Code art. 701 (1870).
34. La. Civ. Code art. 694.
35. See Dallas v. Farrington, 490 So. 2d 265 (La. 1986).
36. Id. at 270.
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recorded, the subsequent purchasers of Willis's estate should have owed
a gratuitous servitude.
Since both concerns of the court as to the applicability of article
694 should have been resolved in favor of the article's application,
further analysis is required of the court's holding that in limited instances
where an article 694 servitude is due, the owner of the enclosed estate
may seek a passage for indemnity pursuant to article 689.
B. The "Balancing of Interests" Test
Prior jurisprudence has consistently held that if a gratuitous passage
is due from one estate to another, the owner of the dominant estate
may not seek another passage. 7 Theoretically, this should remain true
under present Civil Code article 689, which applies only if the owner
of an estate "has no access to a public road,"3 8 since when article 694
is applicable the enclosed owner may demand the gratuitous right-of-
way. This would give the enclosed estate access to a public road and
thereby render article 689 inapplicable. Marceaux v. Broussard39 held
that where a gratuitous passage is owed, the enclosed owner "is not
entitled to an additional right of passage." 4 It has also been stated
that the gratuitous passage "is mandatory, it affords plaintiffs no other
alternative passageway-it simply provides that when the owner of a
portion of land sells a part thereof, and that part becomes inclosed in
consequence of the sale, the vendor must afford a gratuitous passage-
way." ' 4' Moreover, "a landowner should not be allowed to impose by
his own volitional acts the burden of a forced passage on neighboring
lands." '4 Therefore, a landowner should not be permitted to sell an
enclosed portion of his estate and force a neighbor to supply that
enclosed portion with a passage to a public road. This would allow a
person to force an expropriation of a neighbor's, land, when a right of
passage existed over other lands. Based on these principles, the court
in Stuckey could easily have found article 689 inapplicable. The court
did, in fact, recognize that "the importance of not imposing a burden
of forced passage on neighboring lands will be controlling in the majority
of enclosure cases arguably falling under Article 694." 4 Nevertheless,
37. See Langevin v. Howard, 363 So. 2d 1209 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
366 So. 2d 560 (La. 1979); Marceaux v. Broussard, 338 So. 2d 308 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 340 So. 2d 992 (La. 1977).
38. La. Civ. Code art. 689.
39. 338 So. 2d 308.
40. Id. at 311.
41. Brown v. Terry, 103 So. 2d 541, 547 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1958).
42. Yiannopoulos, supra note 18, at 291-92.
43. Stuckey, 464 So. 2d at 348.
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relying on equity, the court utilized a "balancing of interest" test and
found that the case before it was exceptional.The supreme court in Rockholt" discussed the policy underlying
article 689, stating that, "as land becomes less available, more necessary
for public habitation, use, and support, it would run contrary to public
policy to encourage landlocking of such a valuable asset and forever
removing it from commerce and from public as well as private benefit. '4
To achieve the results demanded by this policy, the court in Stuckey
looked to French law controlling enclosed estates. Under the corre-
sponding French Civil Code article, if a gratuitous passage over the
lands composing the original tract cannot be "sufficiently established,"
the enclosed owner may seek a passage for indemnity. 46 The court found
that sufficient passage could not be established because "[c]onstruction
of a road across the property formerly owned by plaintiff's vendor
would be impossible or highly impractical and economically unfeasible. 47
To reach this conclusion, the court balanced the interest of a neighboring
landowner in being free from a burden forced upon him by volitional
acts of another, with the interest of the vendor of an enclosed estate
in being able to maximize the utility of his estate by selling it and
allowing another to fully develop it. The court found that inconvenience
to Collins, the neighboring landowner, was minimal because of the road
already existing across his land. The road only burdened 1/100 of an
acre of his estate and was located in an extreme corner. On the other
hand, to construct a passage across Willis's original tract would have
"cost a fortune." ' 48
When deciding future cases similar to Stuckey, one should begin
with the proposition that a neighboring estate should not be forced to
lend passage to a portion of another estate enclosed by a partition or
44. 256 La. 629, 237 So. 2d 663 (1970).
45. Id. at 668. See Stuckey, 464 So. 2d at 348.
46. The provisions corresponding to La. Civ. Code arts. 689 and 694 are French
Civ. Code arts. 682 and 684, respectively. French Civ. Code art. 684 reads:
Si l'enclave resulte de la division d'un fonds par suite d'une vente, d'un
aechange, d'un partage ou de tout autre contrat, le passage ne peut etre demande
que sur les terrains qui ont fail l'objet de ces actes.
Toutefois, dans le cas ou un passage suffisant ne pourrait; afetre aetabli sur
les fonds divises, 'article 682 serait appliable.
As translated in Cachard, French Civil Code (rev. ed. 1930), this article reads:
If an estate is surrounded because it has been divided in consequence of sale,
exchange, division or any other agreement, the outlet can only be claimed over
the lands forming part of these operations.
Nevertheless, when a sufficient outlet cannot be made over lands thus divided,
article 682 shall apply.
47. Stuckey, 464 So. 2d at 349.
48. Id. at 348.
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voluntary alienation. In cases where the enclosure is the result of a sale,
generally the vendor will be profitting from the transaction, and should,
therefore, bear the burden of providing access. In this and other instances
of partition or voluntary alienation, the owner of the land from which
the enclosed portion is created implicitly agrees to provide its owner
with access to a public road. This contractual obligation should not
befall another absent extreme circumstances. Even if the vendor does
not otherwise use a portion of his estate, and if providing access across
his original tract would result in such a high cost that the vendor could
not both provide a passage and profit from the sale, keeping the unused
portion out of commerce would still not be consistent with public policy.
Although arguably "sufficient passage" should be determined only in
light of the servient estate's capability to afford passage, if the cost of
affording passage would cause the land to remain out of commerce,
that cost should be considered. If the cost of affording passage over
the vendor's land outweighs private and public benefits, a court may
justifiably follow Stuckey.
C. The Impediment to Passage
After employing the "balancing of interest" test and concluding
that article 689 rather than article 694 applied, the court had to determine
whether Stuckey was entitled to a passage free of impediments. Collins
had erected posts and a cable across the roadway which required a key
to effectuate passage. Stopping a vehicle momentarily to gain passage
involved the risk of getting stuck in the mud. Visitors had no way of
gaining Stuckey's attention. Also, utility employees were hindered from
reading meters. Collins testified that he erected the posts and cable
"simply to assert and delineate his ownership of the property crossed
by the road," and he admitted that it served "no useful purpose.' '
49
Civil Code article 690 provides that "[tihe right of passage for the
benefit of an enclosed estate shall be suitable for the kind of traffic
that is reasonably necessary for the use of that estate." 50 In certain
instances, an owner of an enclosed estate may lawfully be subjected to
some inconvenience in exercising passage. In Pittman v. Marshall,5 both
the dominant and servient estates were used for agricultural purposes.
Full utilization of the servient estate included enclosing livestock. Since
a cattleguard in that particular case would have been ineffective, the
court found that the interests of the servient estate in protecting its
cattle outweighed the interests of the dominant estate in unimpeded
49. Id. at 349.
50. La. Civ. Code art. 690.
51. 104 So. 2d 230 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
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passage. Therefore, the enclosed estate's right of passage was justifiably
impeded by a locked gate.
In Stuckey, the dominant estate was used as a place of residence.
In addition, there was no evidence that the servient estate was used for
agricultural purposes. Taking these facts into consideration, the court
concluded that passage should not be impeded. Visitors should be able
to freely pass to a residence and should not have to risk getting their
vehicles stuck in mud while they stop to unlock a cable. Furthermore,
persons such as utility employees required to frequent residences should
not be impeded. The rule which may be derived from the court's analysis
is that, if servient estate interests are insignificant, the dominant estate
should be entitled to unimpeded passage which is "reasonably necessary
for the use of that estate." 52 Although article 690 appears to focus
solely on the dominant estate, in determining what "is reasonably nec-
essary for the use of [the] estate," it is only through this approach of
weighing the interests of both the dominant and servient estates that
equitable results can be achieved.
III. Fuller v. Wright
Property forming a peninsula between Cypress Creek and the Ouach-
ita River had been traversed by a road since 1924. In 1962, it was
partitioned into five parts. Two owners of the inland property fenced
off the road, preventing two waterside owners from reaching their prop-
erty. The waterside owners filed suit for an injunction against the two
inland owners. The trial court granted the injunction, and the second
circuit affirmed."
The court of appeal stated that "[a] CC Art. 694 servitude of
passage must be distinguished from other servitudes of passage." ' 54 The
court went on to indicate that the only requirement of the article 694
right "is that the right of passage must have been previously used or
exercised."" As pointed out earlier, an existing roadway should not be
a pre-requisite to article 694's application. Nevertheless, in Fuller, a
roadway which had been used for a number of years did in fact exist.
By virtue of the partition, the obligation to afford passage was due to
the plaintiffs' estates. Since the roadway existed, the court concluded
that plaintiffs not only had the right to use it, but also to protect their
right by injunctive relief.
52. La. Civ. Code art. 690.
53. Fuller v. Wright, 464 So. 2d 350 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 So. 2d
737 (La. 1985).
54. Id. at 352.
55. Id.
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Article 694 may be distinguished from article 689 in that the latter
requires indemnification. Injunctive relief under article 689 is not proper
unless the parties have consented to, or a court has imposed, a fixed
passage. 6 The fixing of this servitude is not completed until the owner
of the dominant estate compensates the owner of the servient estate."
To establish an article 694 servitude, however, the location only needs
to be agreed upon for a legally protectable right of passage to exist.
Since convention is the basis of the gratuitous servitude, articles 694
and 750 should control its location. If a passageway exists at the time
of a partition or voluntary alienation, article 694 suggests this becomes
the location of the servitude. If a passageway does not exist at the time
of a partition or voluntary alienation, article 750 provides that if the
title is silent, "the owner of the servient estate shall designate the
location. '58 Once a passageway is constructed, the location is designated
and the servitude of passage exists.
The court in Fuller held that the roadway in existence at the time
of the partition linking the enclosed estate with a public road was a
fixed article 694 servitude. Once the article 694 servitude was established,
the owner of the dominant estate could seek injunctive relief to prevent
interference with the passageway. The court did not, however, answer
the question as to what relief an owner of a dominant estate may seek
if a passageway does not exist at the time of the partition or alienation.
In Marceaux v. Reese,59 although the court found that an enclosed
owner was entitled to a gratuitous passage, it held that the servitude
had to be fixed before an injunction would lie prohibiting its interference.
Furthermore, the court held that a suit seeking an injunction was not
the proper procedure through which to fix a right of passage. In so
ruling, the court was in accordance with what Professor Yiannopoulos
has written:
[That article] merely confers on the owner of an enclosed estate
the right to demand the establishment of a servitude of passage
.; it does not by itself give rise to a servitude of passage
nor does it confer on the owner of the enclosed estate authority
to use a particular part of neighboring lands as a passageway
to a public road."
56. See Baldwin Lumber Co. v. Todd, 124 La. 543, 50 So. 526 (1909); Wemple v.
Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637 (1922); Martini v. Cowart, 23 So. 2d 655 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1945); Ezernack v. Ezernack, 18 La. App. 56, 137 So. 626 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1944); and Morgan v. Culpepper, 324 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
57. See Wemple, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637.
58. La. Civ. Code art. 750.
59. 365 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
60. Yiannopoulos, supra note 18, § 96 at 284-85.
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Although the court in Fuller did not address the issue, injunctive
relief may only be proper against the original parties to the act creating
the enclosed estate. As noted above, a recent decision has suggested
that since a servitude fixed in accordance with article 694 is conventional,
recordation should be required for the servitude to be effective against
third persons. 61 In Fuller, even though the predecessors in title had been
the parties involved in partitioning the land, rather than the parties to
the suit, the court did not address this issue. Perhaps this was because
the problem was not evident prior to the more recent case. Whatever
the reason, future application of Fuller may be limited by the recordation
requirement. If not properly recorded, the right to a conventional ser-
vitude may be lost.
IV. Dallas v. Farrington
Robert Farrington, Jr., proposed to subdivide and sell lots from his
land in 1964, but parish authorities refused his plan. Nevertheless, on
October 18, 1965, plaintiffs entered into a purchase agreement to buy
adjacent lots numbered 2 and 3, which had no access to a public road.
The purchase agreement was conditioned upon a servitude of passage
over a proposed street. On December 20, 1965, Farrington sold the lots
to plaintiffs. There was no survey describing the subdivision plan attached
to the act of sale, nor did the act of sale mention a servitude of passage.
Moreover, the act of sale referred to an erroneous plot number. Sub-
sequently, Farrington sold Lot 1 to James Fish. This lot fronted a public
road and was adjacent to Lot 2 owned by plaintiffs. The act of sale
conveying this lot also failed to make reference to the proposed street.
On January 28, 1971, the Jefferson Parish Council approved a
resubdivision plan which differed from Farrington's original proposal.
On April 23, 1973, Farrington sold the remainder of his land to his
son. The next day Farrington filed an act of correction amending the
incorrect plot numbers. His son constructed a fence and blocked the
originally proposed street which plaintiffs had been using for ingress
and egress. Plaintiffs sued for declaratory and injunctive relief. In the
meantime, prior to trial, plaintiffs acquired Lot 1 from James Fish.
Plaintiffs argued that a conventional servitude had been fixed by
the purchase agreement. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the
appellate court's holding that the plaintiffs and Farrington had not
established a conventional predial servitude binding upon Farrington's
son. 62 A conventional predial servitude must be in writing, and to affect
third parties it must be recorded. 63 Although the purchase agreement
61. Dallas, 490 So. 2d 270.
62. Dallas, 490 So. 2d at 269.
63. La. R.S. 9:2721, 2756 (1965 & Supp. 1986). See La. Civ. Code art. 2440, McGuffy
v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 125 So. 2d 154 (1960), and Langevin, 363 So. 2d 1209.
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may have obligated Farrington to grant a servitude, since that agreement
was not recorded, the court found that this obligation had no effect
on Farrington's son. Whether Farrington's son may have had actual
notice of the unrecorded interest was held to be "immaterial."64
Plaintiffs alternatively argued that Farrington's original tract from
which their estate was formed owed them an article 694 legal servitude
of passage. The fifth circuit held that plaintiffs were precluded from
demanding a legal servitude of passage from Farrington's son, because
at the time he purchased the land from his father, the public records
did not indicate the presence of an enclosed estate. Since there was an
erroneous plot number on record, "it was impossible to determine from
the conveyance records that the conveyances of Lots 2 and 3 created
an enclosed estate." 65
The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed with the fifth circuit's hold-
ing that the public records doctrine applies to "legal" servitudes. Since
a legal servitude is "imposed by law,"66 reasoned the court, the public
records do not affect an enclosed owner's right to demand a legal
servitude of passage. More critical, though, was that the supreme court
found that the lower court mistakenly referred to an article 694 right
to passage as a legal servitude. The supreme court held that article 694
confers a right to demand a conventional servitude, and that "plaintiffs
were precluded by the public records doctrine from asserting against
third persons the right to demand creation of a conventional servitude
(just as they would have been precluded from asserting an unrecorded
conventional servitude if one had actually been granted by Farrington). '67
A legal servitude is a limitation "on ownership established by law
for the benefit of the general public or for the benefit of particular
persons. 6 18 Civil Code article 672 classifies "the right of passage for
the benefit of enclosed estates ' 6 9 as a legal servitude. Consistent with
this classification, the supreme court in Dallas characterized Civil Code
article 689 as "a limitation imposed by law on the ownership of lands
surrounding the enclosed estate." ' 70 Although article 694 is included in
the chapter of the Civil Code pertaining to "Legal Servitudes", it is
"juxtaposed with the legal servitude of passage under article 689 and
... ought to be taken to establish a right for the creation of a con-
64. Dallas, 490 So. 2d at 269. See McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100
(La. 1909), and Redmann, The Louisiana Law of Recordation: Some Principles and Some
Problems, 39 Tul. L. Rev. 491, 496 (1965).
65. Dallas v. Farrington, 465 So. 2d 763, 768 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
66. Dallas, 490 So. 2d at 270. See La. Civ. Code art. 659.
67. Dallas, 490 So. 2d at 271.
68. La. Civ. Code art. 659.
69. La. Civ. Code art. 672.
70. Dallas, 490 So. 2d at 270.
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ventional servitude of passage."" Since article 694 is based on the implied
intent of the parties to an agreement, "the demand of a right of passage
under Article 694 is thus the exercise of a contractual right and is to
be contrasted with a demand for a forced passage under Article 689,
which is based directly on law." 72 Therefore, the rules peculiar to con-
ventional, rather than legal, servitudes apply to article 694, including
the law of registry.7
In Dallas, since the description of plaintiffs' property was not re-
corded, Farrington's son was not put on legal notice that plaintiffs were
the owners of an enclosed estate.'4 If he had been, based on Patin v.
Richard, 7 the obligation of his father would have been transmitted to
him. In future cases, it is imperative that the purchaser of a portion
of an estate which becomes enclosed as a result of the sale records
with the act of sale a description which shows the situation of the
estates, so as to gain protection to the fullest extent possible.
Recordation of an article 694 servitude may also be useful in another
context. If the vendor and vendee of a portion of land which becomes
enclosed through the sale create a conventional servitude (independently
of that which arises by virtue of article 694), they must record that
servitude to affect third persons, as it represents a contractual right
which must be written and recorded to affect persons not a party to
the agreement.16 If, however, such a servitude is lost because recordation
requirements are not satisfied, the owner may still demand the gratuitous
right of passage if the situation of the estates has been appropriately
71. Yiannopoulos, supra note 18.
72. Id. at 299.
73. Examples of contrasting an article 689 legal servitude with an article 694 con-
ventional servitude include the following:
Illf the servitude is legal it is imprescriptible, the right of way must be located
in accordance with Article 692, and it may be relocated under the terms of
Article 695. If the servitude is conventional it may be lost by nonuse of ten
years, the right of way must be located in accordance with Articles 749 and
750, and it may be relocated under Article 748. . . . [lf the servitude is legal,
it is free of requirements of publicity; if it is conventional, it is subject to the
requirements of registry in the appropriate public records.
Further, if the servitude is legal, all the owners of lands between the enclosed
estate and the public road are indispensable parties in the proceeding. If the
servitude is conventional, indispensable parties are only those landowners who
contest the right of way.
Yiannopoulos, supra note 18, at 298 n.30.
74. The court noted that plaintiffs did not attack the sale for fraud or simulation,
even though the timing of the transaction was suspicious. Dallas, 490 So. 2d at 269 n.2,
270 n.4.
75. 291 So. 2d 879 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
76. La. R.S. 9:2721, 2756 (1965 and Supp. 1986). See La. Civ. Code art. 2440,
McGuffy, 240 La. 758, 125 So. 2d 154, and Langevin, 363 So. 2d 1209.
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recorded. The successor of the original vendor would be on notice that
an enclosed estate exists and that he is obligated to afford passage.
Therefore, if a fixed conventional servitude is lost, the right to demand
passage authorized by article 694 would still be available.
In Dallas, the supreme court noted that since plaintiffs' right to
demand an article 694 passage was lost, "perhaps plaintiffs at that time
were entitled to a legal servitude under Article 689." 7 This question
had become moot, however, since plaintiffs had acquired Lot 1, which
fronted a public road. The law is established that a legal servitude of
passage is extinguished by a subsequent acquisition of an alternate
passage to a public road.78 Therefore, acquisition of the lot fronting a
public road terminated a legal servitude if one in fact existed.
The implications by the court with respect to this issue constitute
the most significant aspect of Dallas. Arguably, plaintiffs would not
have been able to demand a legal servitude if they had not acquired
Lot 1. Civil Code article 693 provides: "If an estate becomes enclosed
as a result of a voluntary act or omission of its owner, the neighbors
are not bound to furnish a passage to him or his successors. '"79 When
the purchaser of a portion of an estate enclosed as a result of the sale
fails to record the description of the property, then he loses his right
to demand a gratuitous passage and thereby arguably encloses himself.
Thus, within the terms of article 693, such a purchaser may be denied
a legal servitude of passage. The supreme court in Dallas recognized
this problem in stating that "the neighbor's right to defend against a
claim for a legal servitude or obtain indemnity might be affected by
the fact that the neighbor's action caused the estate to be enclosed. '"
Article 693 generally arises in a different context. Usually it applies
when the owner of an estate sells or exchanges land and reserves an
enclosed portion for himself, either failing to create a servitude in his
favor, or creating one and losing it because of prescription of non-use."
In such a situation, the owner of the reserved portion cannot obtain
passage under article 694, and article 689 is inapplicable because enclosure
did not result from "fortuitous events or irresistible force." 2 Even
77. Dallas, 490 So. 2d at 271.
78. See Pousson v. Porche, 6 La. Ann. 118 (1851), and A. Yiannopoulos, supra
note 18, § 103 at 305; see also Perry v. Webb, 21 La. Ann. 247 (1869), and Harvey v.
McMurray, 319 So. 2d 876 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1975); cf. Arcuri v. Cali, 244 So. 2d 309
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
79. La. Civ. Code art. 693.
80. Dallas, 490 So. 2d at 270.
81. See English Realty Co. v. Meyer, 228 La. 432, 82 So. 2d 698 (1955), Henry v.
Rembert, 336 So. 2d 323 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1976), and Estopinal v. Storck's Estate, 44
So. 2d 704 (La. App. Orl. 1950).
82. Yiannopoulos, supra note 18.
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though article 693 may have been drafted in contemplation of only this
type of situation, by its literal wording, the article may not allow the
owner in a situation similar to Dallas to demand a legal servitude. The
legal servitude established by article 689 is an imposition on neighboring
lands, and article 693, if met, precludes the law from enforcing this
imposition.
Nevertheless, a defense may exist against this application of article
693. As long as the original vendor owns the reserved portion of land
from which the enclave was created, the enclosed owner may demand
an article 694 servitude. This is so because the recordation requirement
does not affect immediate parties to a transaction. Therefore, the failure
to properly record the vendee's estate arguably does not result in an
enclosed estate; it is only through a sale by the original vendor to a
third person that the vendee loses his right. Thus, article 693 may not
be applicable.
Even if it is applicable, a question exists concerning who is affected
by article 693: "[lt is not clear whether the word 'successors' in article
693 applies to universal successors only or to both particular and uni-
versal successors." 83 This alone should be enough to encourage taking
precautionary measures not to enclose one's estate, for a subsequent
alienation possibly does not offer a remedy to gaining passage. The risk
that article 693 poses should alert persons purchasing portions of estates
which become enclosed as a result of the sale of the dangers of not
meeting the appropriate recordation requirements.
CONCLUSION
The noted decisions pose more questions than they resolve. Revised
Civil Code article 689, in broadening the definition of an enclosed estate
to include one with "no access to a public road," indicates a shift in
the law recognizing courts' flexibility toward enclosed estates. Although
the court in Tusson did not find an enclosed estate, it set forth guidelines
to apply in expropriation cases. A person may seek a right of passage
even though his lands are not "surrounded by other lands," and he
may conceivably be granted relief if he establishes non-access to the
servitude for passage.
Stuckey exemplifies the shift in judicial attitudes toward formulating
equitable rules in deciding cases involving enclosed estates. This case
recognizes the harshness often accompanied by the effects of the Civil
Code, and that in extreme circumstances a court may deviate from the
pronounced authority found in the Code to achieve desired results.
Stuckey sets forth a reasonable "balancing of interests" test for future
83. Yiannopoulos, supra note 18, at 296.
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application in cases where valuable land otherwise may be taken out of
commerce.
Fuller points out the unique features of article 694. The rules cen-
tering around this article are the most controversial. The problems are
directly attributable to both its wording and its underlying rationale.
One major feature of article 694 is found in Dallas, where the court
concluded that this article provides for a conventional rather than a
legal servitude. Several consequences flow from this holding, especially
with respect to the effect of recordation. Attorneys employed to advise
clients on the purchase of an estate that will become enclosed as a result
of the purchase should be aware of the risks of improper recordation.
Over the last several years courts have become more liberal in their
application of code articles controlling enclosed estates. The legal system
is not blind to the rapid changes in the methods of transferring ownership
of land. As persons developing their estates continue to subdivide and
sell lots, problems will continually arise, and the issues will become
more complex. Nevertheless, the Civil Code and jurisprudence have
served well to establish sound principles that may be continually adapted
to various situations.
Randall L. Wilmore
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